Abstract
Relates previous research on the importance of age in decision‐making to Fama and Jensen’s (1983) ideas on decision management, develops hypotheses on the age of managers and the use of stock‐based compensation in companies with long time horizons (i.e. growth companies) and tests them on 1979‐1987 data for a sample of US firms. Explains the methodology used and presents the results, which show that these firms tend to have younger subordinate executives (but not younger CEOs) and to use less stock‐based compensation the younger these executives are. Suggests this is because younger executives effectively extend the time horizon of older CEOs, thus reducing the need to do this through the compensation package.
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