Abstract
Abstract Herein we examine executive compensation in UK building societies in two differing regulatory regimes: (a) in a weakly competitive environment, and (b) in conditions of increased competition. Our results show that the change in regulation did affect the manner in which CEOs in building societies were remunerated. In particular, when there is little external competition, profitability does not positively influence compensation. However, when this external competition increases, improvements in profitability lead to subsequent increases in CEO remuneration. Our work supports the contention that mutuality can be efficient when operating in a sufficiently competitive environment.
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