Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

Don S Lee

doi:10.1111/gove.12341

Abstract

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.

Highlights

There has been growing research on cabinet appointments in presidential democracies
What other factors can affect presidential behavior, decisions to distribute top executive positions? Under what conditions are presidents pressured to seek coalitional support versus advantaged to appoint nonpartisan loyalists? We argue that presidential cabinet appointment decisions are influenced by the strategy for securing legislative support and the necessity to manage policy performance, and that chief executives’ ability to achieve these goals is determined by a set of political factors
When presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive-legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan ministers

Summary

Introduction

There has been growing research on cabinet appointments in presidential democracies. there is still limited knowledge about how presidents form a cabinet, in the East Asian context. In describing the centrality of balancing the key governing goals with a president's cabinet appointments, we examine executive-legislative relations in 21 administrations of all presidential democracies in East Asia, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, from the time of their recent democratization through 2013.

Results

Conclusion