Exclusion and Verification of Remote Nuclear Reactors with a 1-kiloton Gd -Doped Water Detector

Abstract

To date, antineutrino experiments built for the purpose of demonstrating a nonproliferation capability have typically employed organic scintillators situated as close to the core as possible (typically at a distance of a few meters to tens of meters) and have not exceeded a few tons in size. One problem with this approach is that proximity to the reactor core requires accommodation by the host facility. Water Cherenkov detectors located offsite, at distances of a few kilometers or greater, may facilitate nonintrusive monitoring and verification of reactor activities over a large area. As the standoff distance increases, the detector target mass must scale accordingly. This paper quantifies the degree to which a kiloton-scale gadolinium-doped water Cherenkov detector can exclude the existence of undeclared reactors within a specified distance, and remotely detect the presence of a hidden reactor in the presence of declared reactors, by verifying the operational power and standoff distance using a Feldman-Cousins-based likelihood analysis. A 1-kton scale (fiducial) water Cherenkov detector can exclude gigawatt-scale nuclear reactors up to tens of kilometers within a year. When attempting to identify the specific range and power of a reactor, the detector energy resolution is not sufficient to delineate between the two.