Exchange rates, tax-subsidy schemes, and the revenue from foreign trade in a centrally planned economy

Abstract

It has been argued that while in the traditional analysis of the classic CPE the exchange rate has only an accounting function, inappropriate methods of national income accounting can lead to changes in the exchange rate generating changes in the real economy, provided that trade in unbalanced in foreign currency prices. This thesis was explored by examining the way the profits from foreign trade were calculated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and then transferred to the state budget. It was shown that the correct measure of the state's increased command over domestic resources from engaging in foreign trade, derived from the implicit taxes on that sector, was the ministry's profits on its domestic operations, the first term in (2). However, evidence was presented which suggested that its profits on foreign currency account measured in domestic currency, the second term in (2), were also passed over to the state budget. This implies that transferred profits from foreign trade will overstate the underlying command over resources when there is a balance of payments surplus, and understate them when there is a deficit. The consequence of this is that the domestic economy faces a series of erratic, though small, inflationary and deflationary impulses, regardless of changes in the exchange rate. The theoretical role of the preisausleich system was explored in some detail and it was argued that, although the system has been designed to insulate the domestic economy from external disturbances, there were clear reasons why it had come to play a major part in revenue raising. Specifically, it is administratively convenient to tax resources at their point of entry into or exit from the economy; the taxation of foreign trade widens the tax base and reduces the visibility of the tax system. But, of course, this grafting onto the preisausgleich of a second major function of revenue raising does lead to the development of a further channel through which external disturbances can pass into the domestic economy. That is external disturbances impact on the domestic economy not only through the production and welfare effects of changing exports and imports, and through whatever tenuous links are allowed between foreign and domestic prices, but also insofar as those disturbances affect the ministry's profits from foreign trade. In short, foreign economic disturbances show up in variations in the position of the non-inflationary government budget constraint. To that extent the second function of the preisausgleich impairs its ability to perform its original insulation function. In a minor way, the successful non-inflationary performance of the insulation function has always required adjustments in the government budget constraint. But the growth in the importance of foreign trade taxation has magnified the importance of this phenomenon, and led to a trade-off between the two functions.