Abstract

Imperfections of capital markets and asymmetric information are possible justifications for the public funding of higher education. As such, public expenditure can increase efficiency. However, this efficiency gain is typically made at the cost of inequities which may take the form of elitism. Democratic oversight is needed to check the extent of such elitism. It is argued that admission to higher education should not be determined by elitist criteria, but (owing to informational asymmetries inherent in the educational process) curriculum content should be controlled by the educated elite.

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