Abstract
A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’.
Highlights
In 1948, Norbert Wiener characterised cybernetics as an approach that studied common principles between living organisms and machines [1]
The instrumentalist account entails a conceptual continuity between autopoietic intentionality and representationality: the very properties that are essential for autopoiesis and sense-making are the grounds of the fictionalist ascription of representational content
The strong life-mind continuity thesis examined in this paper entails that the same concepts that are central to explaining basic minds are central to understanding non-basic minds
Summary
In 1948, Norbert Wiener characterised cybernetics as an approach that studied common principles between living organisms and machines [1]. Examples include Evan Thompson’s autopoietic notion of intentionality [25], Daniel Hutto’s basic intentionality [26], or Hutto’s and Glenda Satne’s ur-intentionality [27] (for overviews of enactivist accounts of intentionality and discussion, see [28,29]) These authors characterise intentionality as a property of entire systems (not of a subject’s mental states). (i) How strong is the explanatory continuity between life and mind [31], i.e., can the concepts and principles that account for a basic form of intentionality account for higher cognitive phenomena, including phenomena involving representations [7]? We will argue that FEP supports a strong life-mind continuity thesis because even the most basic forms of intentionality can be regarded as involving a form of ‘as if’ representationality. We argue that a realist account of representation and a strong life-mind continuity thesis can coherently be maintained
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