Examining Schnorrs protocol in the context of zero-knowledge proofs

Abstract

The rise of technology has brought with it a heightened awareness of the necessity to shield personal data and maintain exclusive access to specific knowledge. A notable solution that emerged from this consciousness is Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) and, more specifically, Schnorrs Protocol. Historically, Zero-Knowledge Proofs have a compelling lineage, tracing their roots back to the fervent discussions among cryptographers aiming to achieve a balance between information sharing and privacy. ZKPs are cryptographic methods that allow one party to prove to another that a statement is true, without revealing any specific information about the statement itself. In the midst of these developments, Schnorrs Protocol emerged as a renowned interactive proof system. It possesses an intuitive structure that has made it pivotal in the enhancement of digital security. The typical flow of Schnorrs Protocol begins with the prover sending a commitment to the verifier. The verifier then sends a random challenge back to the prover, who, in turn, produces a response. Whats captivating is that the verifier can ascertain the validity of the proof without gaining insight into the underlying secret. Interactive Schnorrs Protocol involves real-time back-and-forth communication between the prover and verifier. On the other hand, the non-interactive version eliminates this need by using a cryptographic hash function, thereby streamlining the process.