Examining prosecutorial decision‐making in plea bargaining: An experimental paradigm in a community sample

Abstract

AbstractScholars estimate that 90–95% of guilty pleas are the result of plea bargaining and there is a growing body of empirical research on plea bargain decision‐making. We use a new experimental paradigm that mimics prosecutors’ actual decision‐making processes to examine factors that influence plea bargaining decisions. Participants received a casefile detailing a theft from an electronics store. This casefile—fabricated to reflect one a prosecutor would actually receive—included a police report, witness statements, and a criminal history report. In these materials, we manipulated the defendant's motive, the severity of the crime, and the defendant's criminal history and measured the impact of these factors on participants’ decisions to offer a plea and the severity of the plea offers—operationalized as sentence offer length. The results indicated that the vast majority of the participants initially decided to offer a plea. The severity of the crime (operationalized as value of the theft) and defendant's criminal history impacted plea decisions, such that higher severity and a criminal history of theft increased the length of the sentence offer. Contrary to our hypothesis, the defendant's motive had no effect on plea offers. These results parallel current sentencing practices codified in law. Policy implications are discussed.