Examining Power-sharing in Persistent Conflicts: De Facto Pseudo-statehood versus de JureQuasi-federalism

Abstract

The reasons that explain the failures in power-sharing lie in the notions of sovereignty and territoriality and their applications in the (post-)modern world. While territory is largely perceived as indivisible, sovereignty is seen as something that could be shared. Power-sharing schemes tend to fail because of the incompatibility of these two principles. Although enduring compromises between facts and norms may allow talks about diffused power and fuzzy identities and are therefore an asset, they do not offer a recipe of how to end zero-sum games and provide communal security. The aim of this paper is to examine comparatively recent attempts to resolve persistent conflicts through power-sharing in Cyprus, Moldova and Bosnia & Herzegovina. It concludes that although power-sharing is compatible with the normative categories stipulated in international law, solving modern conflicts necessitates a rethinking of the concepts over which these conflicts are taking place.