Abstract
Abstract. We investigated whether consequentialist motives may underlie punishment decisions in single-round (i.e., one-shot) social dilemmas in which there is no prospect of reciprocity. In particular, we used an incentivized public goods game to examine how the prospect of receiving information on the effect of punishment (i.e., information that indicates potential regret and intention for future behavioral change on the part of the transgressor) affects people’s punishment decisions. We also took person-situation interactions into account and studied whether prosocial individuals (i.e., persons high in Honesty-Humility and Social Value Orientation) punish more strongly when they receive consequentialist information. The data did neither reveal the hypothesized effects of information availability on punishment decisions nor were these effects conditional on dispositional prosociality. We discuss potential limitations of these findings as well as open questions for future research.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
