Abstract
ABSTRACT This article examines policymaking behind bargaining and implementing ex-ante and macroeconomic conditionalities. The aim is to show the process of building governance in European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy. This process is examined via the principal–agent framework which enables studying EU policymaking through delegation and agency. The results show the limits of the principal–agent model in interpreting a principal’s failure to monopolize control, notably punitive means. The paper then asserts that policymaking behind conditionalities showed some promises on delivery in building governance, yet with the apparent limits. To overcome them, clarifying relations with other governance modes such as the European Semester would be needed. Additionally, conditionalities’ result orientation should improve through rules predictability and consistent applicability of the governance framework. Therefore, governance built on conditionalities is still in the making.
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