Exalting the Meek Virtue of Humility in Aquinas

Abstract

‘Augustine says that “almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility.” ’ There is an abundance of writing in the past decade or so about humility in Thomas Aquinas' name.2 According to one interpreter, Shawn Floyd, Thomas' writing is so fecund exactly because he ‘provides one of the most thorough accounts of humility one can find within the Christian tradition.’3 The consensus seems to be that Thomas' thorough account of humility proves useful because it remains relevant. Humility appears an anti-modern virtue that can help us address the problems of the post-modern age. A recent piece setting out on this note appears in the annals of this journal in 2012: Catherine Hudak Klancer's ‘How Opposites (Should) Attract: Humility as a Virtue for the Strong.’4 Klancer counters present-day attitudes toward humility with a ressourcement of Thomas Aquinas and, fascinatingly, Zhu Xi. Aquinas' and Xi's shared judgments emphasize the crucial importance of humility for a flourishing common and political life, as relevant to the 12th and 13th centuries as to contemporary democracy. magnanimity and humility are two sides of one coin, two complementary perspectives, from above and below, of the will to embrace and pursue a true vision of what it is to be human, based upon a true understanding of our final end … This claim, brought out in Thomas' treatment of these virtues, illuminates the landscape of modernity and perhaps points to the root of the modern malaise … the odd juxtaposition of exaggerated pride and exaggerated humility, of presumption and pusillanimity hand in hand.6 As bountiful and thought-provoking as this writing is, it can distract readers of Thomas from a more conspicuous problem. The problem is this: Thomas did not have much to say about humility. Out of the 512 questions of his incomplete Summa Theologiae, he devoted only one to the topic. Thomas gives short shrift to humility. This small irony frames my initial approach to humility. I describe how, given the structure and ordering of the Summa, Thomas' treatment of humility is actually too modest (Section I). This critique might give the impression that Thomas is unhelpful when it comes to humility. I think this, too, is a mistake. What little Thomas does say in the Summa is helpful insofar as he provides the seeds for a more robust account of humility. In this essay I merely experiment with what a more robust ‘Thomistic account’ might look like. I follow a twofold approach to Thomas by imagining how he might have maintained the scheme of the Summa while properly emphasizing the place of humility in the Christian life (Section II) and by suggesting how Thomas' thin account of humility in the Summa can also be developed further by tending to other writings by Thomas (Section III). These efforts should interest contemporary interpreters because it seems they are trying to retrieve a ‘Thomistic account’ of humility that is in fact not in Thomas' Summa. This article is an overture to an extended account of humility in the Thomistic vein that applauds the efforts of these contemporary interpreters while offering a few modest corrections. It makes sense to begin with the placement of Thomas' single question on humility within the twenty-eight questions on temperance in the Summa's Secunda Secundae. Temperance's integral part includes the virtue of honesty. Temperance's subjective parts concern the pleasures of food and the flesh. And temperance has four potential parts, which are virtues directed toward certain secondary acts or matters, ‘not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue’ of temperance (ST 2a2ae q48 a1). These potential parts include continence, clemency, meekness, and modesty. Finally, Thomas writes that modesty is a virtue that ‘differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraining is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty’ (ST 2a2ae q160 a2 co). Modesty moderates lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. Modesty includes four kinds of moderation: (i) studiousness, which moderates the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, (ii) modesty in exterior movements, which moderates bodily movements and actions, and (iii) modesty in outward apparel, which moderates dress and (iv) humility, which moderates ‘the movement of the mind towards some excellence’ (ST 2a2ae q160 a2). This is the overall structure within which we find humility: as a merely potential part of temperance (not having the whole power of temperance itself) under the subordinate virtue of modesty (which moderates matters that ‘present [even] less difficulty’ than temperance) which requires that humility simply tempers movements of the mind (lest it tends to high things immoderately rather than the alternative of strengthening good activity) (ST 2a2ae q161 a1). To put this more concretely, this account of humility oddly suggests that disciplining our bodily desires and pleasures (abstinence, sobriety, and chastity) is easier than exercising simple humility. This magnificent reversal of expectations means that humility suffers a lowly place in the Thomistic hierarchy. Humility is a virtue of the concupiscible appetite, not of reason. Humility regulates one's interior disposition – it does not contribute directly to the common good. It moderates and restrains activity – it does not strengthen and encourage activity like magnanimity does. Since it is less excellent than the theological virtues, humility does not have the last end as its object. is not without its drawbacks, for it does not always allot to the specifically Christian virtues the place they deserve. This is the case, for example, with humility, which is practically nonexistent in the lists used and is connected with modesty in Cicero's list, which is itself a part of temperance. Humility thus receives an overly modest position, which is understandable among pagan authors, but St. Thomas knows perfectly well its importance in Christian tradition.10 Thomas comes closer to the tradition – namely he relies upon and develops it – in his actual treatment of humility. He acknowledges the centrality of this virtue in Scripture and tradition. Within this one question Thomas cites a host of sources: Sirach, Isaiah, the Psalms, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, 1 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, James, Origen, Augustine, John Chrysostom, Gregory the Great, Benedict … In light of this great cloud of witnesses, I don't fault Thomas for the content of his treatment of humility. Rather I wonder about its form. The form within which Thomas develops humility requires that it remain – even as a preeminent virtue in the Christian life – ‘overly modest.’11 Thomas' form denies the specifically Christian virtue of humility the place it deserves.12 Although Scripture and tradition provide a common witness that prioritizes humility, Thomas allows this priority to be eclipsed through his reliance on philosophical ordering principles. We know that Pincakers is right about this formal problem in Thomas precisely because so few Thomists have written on humility. And perhaps the reason that so few Thomists have written on humility over the past several centuries is not because they are bad Thomists, but precisely because they are good ones. They are ‘good’ in the sense that they follow Thomas' lead. Namely, they don't write much about it. Hence there is an overabundance of Thomistic tomes on charity, prudence, justice, fortitude – and few – and, if I am not mistaken, just one tome on humility.13 In sum, the many contemporary appropriations mentioned at the outset of this article seem to be at fault by their overly charitable reading of Thomas – a fault that is not all bad! These contemporary interpretations are faithful to the common witness of Christian tradition, but unfaithful to Thomas. They conceive Thomas' treatment in the Summa as more faithful to the tradition than he is. They read Thomas as having worked out a difficulty that he never quite overcame – the difficulty of how to allow philosophical ordering principles to structure a discussion without letting them constrain his theological subject matter. In sum, these contemporary interpreters display exactly how interesting humility is, but effectively sidestep the difficulties that also make humility in Thomas problematic. Humility is interesting and problematic because, according to my argument thus far, Thomas is aware of the importance of this Christian virtue and yet de-emphasizes it in his most mature moral teaching. If it is true that Thomas' treatment of humility in the Summa generates a ‘problem,’ then how might it be solved? One potential answer strikes me as immodest. For humility's sake I suggest it: Thomas ought to have exalted humility in the Summa to a higher place among the virtues. Thomas orders the 189 questions of the Secunda Secundae (of which humility is Question 161) first according to the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) and then according to the moral virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance). This order is striking when juxtaposed with the order he gives to the virtues in the Prima Secundae. Yet neither ordering reflects how we receive or develop the virtues. Of course the theological virtues are of first importance in the Christian life, and charity even influences the ‘form’ of the moral virtues to yield Thomas' fascinating (and potentially problematic) category of infused moral virtues.14 ‘That charity is the form of all the virtues,’ Stanley Hauerwas explains, ‘means therefore how-we-do-what-we-do makes all the difference for how what-we-do makes us virtuous.’15 As Thomas shifts in the Secunda Secundae from the theological virtues (QQ1–46) to the moral virtues (QQ47–170), he reveals an integrated moral organism – the body of moral teaching animated by its theological soul.16 At the same time, Thomas' manner of proceeding is indebted to philosophy which makes it incongruous with his object of inquiry. His coursing first through prudence, then justice, then fortitude, and finally temperance is ordered according to the traditional philosophical hierarchical ordering of human powers that are the subject of virtue: the intellect (prudence), the rational appetite (justice), and the sense appetites (fortitude, temperance). Earlier I mentioned that Thomas places humility under the last and the least virtue: temperance. ‘Temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation,’ Thomas explains, ‘is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure’ (ST 2a2ae q141 a3 co). These passions can pull us in a number of destructive directions – either in immoderate pursuit of the sensible and bodily good, or in unreasonable flight from sensible and bodily evils. The sum effect of temperance is to safeguard the good of reason by moderating these passions. As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. I.2) ‘the good of the many is more godlike than the good of the individual,’ wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still. (ST 2a2ae q141 a8 co) There is more. I already outlined how humility assumes the last and least place under temperance – whereas virtues such as shamefacedness and honesty are integral parts of temperance, and sobriety and chastity are subjective parts, humility is merely a potential part.19 ‘Merely’ because it does not even have the full power of temperance. What is important to grasp is this: whereas temperance ‘brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate,’ humility falls under ‘another virtue about matters of lesser import’ to help ‘moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult’ (ST 2a2ae q160 a1 co). In sum, the Thomistic hierarchy does not extol the virtue of humility. Yet the substance of Thomas' thought on humility may help question this problematic hierarchy. This is the first clue for how to better prioritize humility within his existing scheme of the virtues. We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1 Peter 2:13, ‘Be ye subject … to every human creature for God's sake’; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria. (ST 2a2ae q161 a3 ad1) Seeing God's gifts within others causes us to honor and esteem them better than ourselves. This is humility. Seeing God's gifts within ourselves alongside our deficiencies causes us to think little of ourselves. This too is humility.20 Humility is necessary in Thomas' account because of his theological anthropology, centering on God's gift and spilling over into our truthful relationships with others and even ourselves. Thomas' writing on humility in the Summa also lends itself to interpretation by another light, namely, its affinity to the virtue of justice. This is the second clue for exalting humility: ally humility with justice. Justice resides in a more excellent part of the soul than temperance. Justice arises from shunning evil and clinging to the good with respect to our natural and supernatural ends. With justice comes many virtues – restitution, affability, religion, devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, making oaths, taking vows, piety, honor, worship, obedience, gratitude, truthfulness, liberality, fairness. Religion (ST 2a2ae qq81–100) and truth (ST 2a2ae q109) seem to especially draw humility within their scope. Humility is the appropriate response of a creature standing before her Creator. When Thomas asserts that ‘to God alone do we owe worship,’ he draws humility into the religious act of latria, adoration (ST 2a2ae q161 a3 ad1). His consistent language that ‘we owe worship’ reminds the reader that he construes the acts of devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, worship (and many more) under religion as a potential part of justice. It is a part of justice because justice considered in itself concerns ‘owing’ another, or giving another his or her due. But religion is merely a potential part because it falls short of justice – we can never give God His due. Recall that humility is a potential part of a virtue, but for the opposite reason. Humility falls short of temperance because it concerns something lesser; religion falls short of justice because it concerns God. Sometimes Thomas compares the orderly assembly of virtues to a building, whose foundation must be first laid before the rest of the building. Thomas is clear that humility is the foundation of the spiritual edifice in making us submissive and open to the influx of divine grace (ST 2a2ae q161 a5). This, alongside the virtues connected to religion, seems to pull both into a single movement of our response to God through worship, adoration, and prayer. In emphasizing their fundamental integrity, Thomas describes these virtues as ‘concurrent’ – as literally running together.21 Thomas' treatment of justice is notoriously complex, especially because he includes within this treatment a consideration of truth.22 Truth, as a virtue, is like justice because it (i) is directed toward another and (ii) involves what is due (ST 2a2ae q109 a3).23 Like religion, truth falls short of the proper aspect of justice. This is because it is not a legal debt, but rather a moral one ‘insofar as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth’ (ST 2a2ae q109 a3).24 Thomas states that man can be said to be ‘true’ on account of any and all of his virtues – for his virtues mean that his life attains its rule and measure in conformity with the divine law. Thomas would agree that the truth of our existence concerns most fundamentally our relationship with God and therefore a life lived in response to, and in conversation with, the self-communication of God in charity. Justice, truth, and charity reflect the image of God in us. If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss [Augustine, De Natura et Gratia QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Philippians 2:3, ‘Esteem others better than themselves,’ says: ‘We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden.’ (ST 2a2ae q161 a3 ad2) It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men … Without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God, according to 2 Corinthians 3:5: ‘Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God.’ (ST 2a2ae q161 a6 ad1) Thomas' account of agency, grace, and merit complements his account of humility.25 Thomas believes that we can perform meritorious action only through God's help in grace. He believes that we can become exalted in God's sight only through confiding in God's help. Accordingly he writes: ‘It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God's sight.’ (ST 2a2ae q161 a2 ad2). This is yet another aspect of how humility is expressed through a truthful relationship with God – in acknowledging the truth that our good activity is dependent upon grace. My overall aim is to suggest a better placement of humility in Thomas' larger scheme of the virtues in the Summa. The first two clues seem to work together. This second clue of how humility can be drawn closer to justice dovetails with the first, which concerns Thomas' actual writing on humility rather than its problematic division. Thomas' account of humility has features in common with the virtues connected with justice: it grows together with the virtues of religion and it concerns the truthfulness of all our relationships. A third and final clue brings humility even closer to justice, namely, the ‘political’ features they both share. Thomas thinks justice is political precisely because it concerns our neighbors and God. This makes justice different from the other moral virtues. The other moral virtues concern our dealings with ourselves while justice rectifies our dealings with others. Justice is a virtue that perfects our rational appetite while also remaining fundamentally social. In the particular community where I learned about it, humility was an integral part of a salvific economy which was quite close to what Stanley Hauerwas has characterized as an ‘apolitical account of individual salvation.’ Humility was an essential feature of a technique designed to acquire individual immortality in heaven. Stanley Hauerwas points out the obvious limitation of, and surprisingly Cartesian assumption behind, this interpretation of humility, in particular, and of Christianity, in general … Instead of personal immortality there and then in some heavenly abode achieved by whatever means one has already to hand (even if that includes domination, manipulation, and other methods of control), the truly humble will struggle together as a form of celebration. That celebration occurs in a community of lowly souls, divided in so many of their particular features, and yet united in their attempt to achieve an ever more authentic praxis of love, here and now. On this approach, humility becomes less a technique designed to win salvation for my self later over there and more a struggle to realize our always already connectedness to and community with the radically other even in the more proximate others (especially in those who live well beyond the nexus of power, e.g., the mentally retarded, those who are disfigured, and even those dying of wretched diseases) with whom I am always-already in community in the here and now.26 I began this article with a critique of contemporary readings of Thomas' account of humility in the Summa. I am critical of these readings precisely because I am critical of Thomas' own account of humility. Thomas' account is problematic because he follows philosophical ordering principles rather than disciplining his mind to Augustine's insight cited in the epigraph that ‘almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility.’ If this insight is true and so little of Thomas' teaching is humility, then Thomas gives humility too modest a place. Yet there are still resources in Thomas' magisterial moral vision that can be used to develop an alternative to his account. In this second section (Section II), I have sketched a preliminary strategy: to consider humility as a part of justice. In sum, because of the breadth and depth of justice, humility can be thought of in connection to a multiplicity of relevant contemporary themes such as authority, democratic process, civic significance, law-abidingness, peace, and the flourishing of social and political life. Of course this will also mean that one can only think of these themes properly when one has given due consideration to the fundamental definition of humility as reverence to God. Thomas insists that humility concerns God primarily and others secondarily. Thomas's pithy account of humility is – if anything – essentially ‘theological.’ He casts humility as an infused moral virtue that pulls all of human life into its supernatural horizon (ST 2a2ae q161 a4–5). It is not clear that Thomas even envisions an acquired (or non-theological) counterpart for humility. Rather it seems every expression of humility is, first and last, God-given and God-geared. More pointedly, would it be surprising for Christians if humility turned out to have almost no social value, on the usual utilitarian measures? Jesus himself, the paradigm of humility (according to Philippians 2) whom Christians are called to imitate in virtue, appeared to threaten many dimensions of the social and political order of the day; that's why in the end almost everyone wanted to kill him.27 There exists yet another strategy for recovering the importance of humility in Thomas: by attending to his larger corpus. Examples abound – his commentaries, sermons, prayers. I capture vignettes from three of Thomas' commentaries: the Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on the Gospel of John, and on the Apostles' Creed. I chose these commentaries because they help fill out another aspect of humility that seems to be missing in Thomas' portrait of humility in the Summa: that humility is a foundation for Christian's spiritual edifice grounded in Christ. This Christological foundation may seem obvious. Yet in the contemporary appropriations of Thomas' treatment of humility, Christ is absent. My attentions in this section show why this absence misrepresents the mind of Thomas and the character of humility. ‘I ought to be baptized by you, and you come to me?’ And Jesus answering, said to him: ‘Suffer it to be so now. For so becomes us to fulfill all justice.’ Then he suffered him. The second aspect of humility: in Jesus' baptism Thomas says that humility serves as an entryway into the Christian life. This importance is shown through Jesus and through John, for John too shows humility in submitting to Christ's will. And throughout the Commentary Thomas iterates humility's connection to baptism. Humility must be present in order to receive grace. At that hour, the disciples came to Jesus, saying ‘Who do you think is greater in the kingdom of heaven?’ And Jesus, calling upon him a little child, set him in the midst of them. And Jesus said: ‘Amen I say to you, unless you be converted, and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child in my name, receives me.’ It ought to be said that humility necessarily accompanies charity. And you can see this if you would consider anyone who is humble. For as in pride there are two things, an inordinate affection and an inordinate opinion of oneself such is the contrary in humility, because it does not care about its own superiority. Likewise, it does not consider itself worthy. This necessarily leads to charity … Therefore the more humility a man has, so much the more does he love God, and the more he despises his own excellence, the less he attributes to himself: and so the more charity a man has, the more humility he has. When [Christ] had washed their feet, and taken his garments, and resumed his place [again], he said to them, ‘Do you know what I have done to you? You call me Teacher and Lord; and you are right, for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you.’ [Christ] said the reason [He] did this was to give you an example; so ‘you also ought to wash one another's feet,’ because that was what [He] intended by this action. For when we are dealing with the conduct of people, example has more influence than words … What one chooses is a better indication of what is good than what one teaches should be chosen. This is why when someone says one thing and does another, what he does has more influence on others than what he has taught … Now the mere example of a mere human being would not be adequate for the entire human race to imitate, both because human reason cannot take everything into account, and it does err in what it does take into account. And so there was given to us the example of the Son of God, which cannot be in error and is adequate for all situations. Thus Augustine says: ‘Pride is not healed if it is not healed by the divine humility.’ (Commentary on John, Chapter 13, lecture 3, n1781.) There is not in fact a single example of virtue that the Cross does not give to us. You seek an example of charity? ‘There is no greater love than to give up his life for his friends,’ and Christ did it on the Cross … And are you looking for an example of patience? The most perfect patience is found on the Cross … Are you seeking an example of humility? Look at the Crucified One (Exposito in Symbolum Apostolorum, Article 4, Nos. 920–24). The Ascension is reasonable because of the humility of Christ. There never was humility so great as that of Christ, who, although He was God, yet wished to become man; and although He was the Lord, yet wished to take the form of a servant, and, as St. Paul says: ‘He was made obedient unto death’ [Phil 2:8], and descended even into the underworld. For this He deserved to be exalted even to heaven and to the throne of God, for humility leads to exaltation. (Exposito in Symbolum Apostolorum Art 6. No 3 )30 Short selections from these three commentaries conjointly emphasize the importance of understanding Christ for understanding the Christian virtue of humility. As we have seen thus far, without the assistance of his other writing Thomas' preoccupation with Christ's teaching and Christ's example of humility can be lost. This additional textual evidence helps pose a more specific challenge to the contemporary accounts of humility because it specifies the Theos, which ‘theological’ humility concerns. In his commentaries Thomas hones in on the Exemplar of humility, the One Who is perfect God and perfect man. Christ teaches humility and He is its example. He is our humble beginning in grace and exalted end in glory. Besides the Summa and the commentaries I selected, there are many more occasional examples from Thomas' writings that would fill out this Christological portrait of humility. Indeed, perhaps the most fecund alternative sources remain in his sermons (where he loved the theme of the vetula who knew more than a proud intellectual31) and in his prayers and his life (where he enacted that which he wrote about). Finally, it is possible to re-approach humility in the Summa in this light: although the Summa may have not given the virtue of humility its due, the act of writing the Summa is itself an act of humility. Thomas gave up a career of university teaching to lead a more humble life teaching beginners in theology, to whom he dedicated the Summa.32 The Summa itself, then, both teaches humility and it is an example of humility. Parts are of three kinds, namely, ‘integral,’ as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; ‘subjective,’ as ox and lion are parts of animal; and ‘potential,’ as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul … The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature, Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God … On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency. If you seek an example of humility, look upon Him who is crucified; although He was God, He chose to be judged by Pontius Pilate and to be put to death: ‘Your cause has been judged as that of the wicked’ [Job 36:17]. Truly ‘that of the wicked,’ because: ‘Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death’ [Wis 2:20]. The Lord chose to die for His servant; the Life of the Angels suffered death for man: ‘He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross’ [Phil 2:8].