Exaggerating unintended effects? Competing narratives on the impact of conflict minerals regulation

Abstract

This article contributes to the literature on unintended effects by adding a dimension to existing typologies: exaggerated unintended effects. It analyses the existence of this dimension resulting from the adoption of the United States’ conflict minerals legislation, the Dodd-Frank act, article 1502. The article makes evident that there were two competing narratives on the unintended effects of the American regulation: the duration and the scope of the de facto embargo. While in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; the target of the legislation) the negative unintended effects were declining, the dominant narrative on unintended effects was not changing and omitted crucial elements. A quantitative analysis shows that especially those companies that stood to gain from deregulation did not incorporate these positive developments into their narrative. The narratives of other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations and investors, progressed together with the changes observed in the DRC. The research indicates how the discussion on unintended effects impacted the formulation on conflict minerals regulation in the European Union. The article concludes by drawing parallels to debates on unintended negative effects in other domains of international cooperation, such as migration. It is suggested that policy makers, researchers and journalists verify claims of negative unintended effects before integrating them into their own narratives.