Abstract
Consider an abstract social choice setting with incomplete information, where the number of alternatives is large. Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms is infeasible due to the prohibitive communication constraints. However, if players restrict attention to a subset of the alternatives, feasibility may be recovered. This article characterizes the class of subsets that induce an ex-post equilibrium in the original game. It turns out that a crucial condition for such subsets to exist is the availability of a type-independent optimal social alternative for each player. We further analyze the welfare implications of these restrictions. This work follows that of Holzman et al. [2004] and Holzman and Monderer [2004] where similar analysis is done for combinatorial auctions.
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