Evolving Electric Utility Regulatory Policy

Abstract

Abstract. Current electric utility pricing methods understate the marginal social casts of electricity. Electricity prices are set to cover the utility's average cost rather than the higher marginal social cost. This mispricing hides from consumers the true cost their consumption imposes on society and, thereby, encourages them to ignore efficient conservation opportunities. Additionally, the conservation market suffers from a number of imperfections such as barriers to the acquisition of information, high upfront capital costs and the lack of conservation equipment availability. The electricity and conservation multimarket equilibrium is not achieved. The result is that society overconsumes (excess demand) electricity, overinvests in electric generating plants and underinvests (excess supply) in conservation resources. The large, yet uncertain, level of foregone conservation investment offers new opportunities for regulators and electric utility managers to improve economic efficiency with regulatory and planning policies that appropriately encourage the cost effective use of conservation resources. In the absence of the most efficient policy, marginal social cost pricing, integrated resource planning (IRP) is being adopted as a potential second‐best regulatory policy and utility resource planning framework to improve energy efficiency. IRP uses mathematical optimization methods to search among many alternate resource portfolios of electricity creating and saving technologies. These methods identify the mix that best meets society's needs with the least social cost, where the social external costs and benefits of generating plant and conservation, respectively, are considered. Such a goal requires the choice of a resource portfolio that optimizes a complex objective function. As a result, the solution offers a resource action plan for electric utilities that may be Pareto‐improving.