Evolutionary stability of mixed strategies on graphs

Abstract

Up to the present time, the study of evolutionary dynamics mostly focused on pure strategy games in finite discrete strategy space, either in well-mixed or structured populations. In this paper, we study mixed strategy games in continuous strategy space on graphs of degree k. Each player is arranged on a vertex of the graph. The edges denote the interaction between two individuals. In the limit of weak selection, we first derive the payoff functions of two mixed strategies under three different updating rules, named birth–death, death–birth and imitation. Then we obtain the conditions for a strategy being a continuously stable strategy (CSS), and we also confirm that the equilibrium distribution corresponding to the CSS is neighborhood attracting and strongly uninvadable. Finally, we apply our theory to the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game to obtain possible CSS. Simulations are performed for the two special games and the results are well consistent with the conclusions we made.