Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China.

Feng Guo,Junwu Wang,Yinghui Song,Denghui Liu

doi:10.3390/ijerph181910392

Abstract

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

Highlights

With the development of urbanization and population growth, China’s demand for construction is increasing
Since 2013, China has built more than 4 billion square meters of buildings every year, and this construction speed is expected to continue in the few decades, with an increase of 33 billion square meters by 2040 [1]
This paper considers using a suitable mathematical model to deal with these uncertainties and to clarify the relationship between the government’s willingness to participate, the construction units’ desire to provide safety education, and the construction workers’ willingness to participate in these training

Summary

Introduction

With the development of urbanization and population growth, China’s demand for construction is increasing. Since 2013, China has built more than 4 billion square meters of buildings every year, and this construction speed is expected to continue in the few decades, with an increase of 33 billion square meters by 2040 [1]. Such a huge demand for construction will bring many job opportunities, leading to more people engaging in the construction industry. Rapid completion aside, developers have to consider the probability of construction safety accidents. The construction industry has only about 7% share of the global labour

Objectives

Discussion

Conclusion