Evolutionary mechanism of green product certification behavior in cement enterprises: A perspective of herd behavior

Abstract

While the United Nations advocates for sustainable production and consumption, the implementation of green product certification for cement enterprises is still in its infancy. This study focuses on understanding the evolution mechanism of cement enterprises adopting green product certification, and identifying the factors that influence this evolution involving cement enterprises, certification bodies, and the government. Based on herd behavior, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed, leading to several conclusions. (1) When cement enterprises, certification bodies, and the government participate in green product certification, five evolutionarily stable strategies emerge in the evolutionary game system. (2) Key factors influencing participation in green product certification include the rent-seeking preference of cement enterprises, the transportation distance of cement products, the intensity of government regulation, and the success rate of regulation. (3) The rent-seeking preferences of cement enterprises have varying impacts on the rent-seeking behavior of certification bodies and the subsidy behavior of the government. (4) The transportation distances of cement products also have diverse effects on the rent-seeking behavior of certification bodies and the green product certification behavior of cement enterprises. This research offers valuable insights for governments in establishing and enhancing policies related to building material products.