Abstract
While in previous models of pre-play communication players are forced to communicate, we investigate what happens if players can choose not to participate in this cheap talk. Outcomes are predicted by analyzing evolutionary stability in a population of a priori identical players. If the game following the communication rewards players who choose the same action then an efficient outcome is only guaranteed when participation in the pre-play communication is voluntary. If however players aim to coordinate on choosing different actions in the underlying game and there are sufficiently many messages then the highest payoff is selected when players are forced to talk to each other before playing the game.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.