Abstract

Evolutionary games are introduced as models for repeated anonymous strategic interaction: actions (or behaviors) which are more fit, given the current distribution of behaviors, tend over time to displace less fit behaviors. Cone fields characterize the continuous-time processes compatible with a given fitness (or payoff) function. For large classes of dynamics, it is shown that all stable steady states are Nash equilibria and that all Nash equilibria are steady states. The biologists' evolutionarily stable strategy condition is shown to be less closely related to the dynamic equilibria. Economic examples and a literature survey are also provided. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

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