Abstract
Currently, the world is facing two significant challenges: low-carbon development and overcapacity. Government departments must reexamine their development strategy of energy industry. Implementing environmental regulatory policies and technological innovation can help alleviate coal industry’s overcapacity, while sustainable development requires joint actions of governments, enterprises, and the market. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, power industry, and coal enterprise. Under the premise of bounded rationality, the evolution path of each player in the game under the market incentive environmental regulation is analyzed, and the influence of the change of parameters of each player on the result is numerically simulated. The study found that strengthening environmental regulation by local governments is an inevitable choice to promote the transformation and upgrading of coal industry and power industry. In addition, reducing law enforcement costs and technological innovation costs are the fundamental point of the coordinated development of the three parties. Technological innovation in the power industry will reduce the probability of coal companies’ choosing clean production strategies, while seeking low-cost clean production technology and financial support is the key to coal companies’ optimization of production capacity.
Highlights
Environmental protection has always been the focus of all countries’ attention, and many countries are pursuing more stringent environmental regulations to achieve green and low-carbon development. e Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement signed by many countries aim to control greenhouse gas emissions; economic growth is inevitably accompanied by substantial increase in power generation [1]
This paper uses evolutionary game theory to contemplate the intensity of carbon emission reduction and coal market demand after technological upgrading in the coal and power industries, and studies the behavioral strategy relationship and dynamic evolution mechanism among the three-party game players of the local government, power industry, and coal enterprises under different constraint scenarios so as to provide a theoretical reference for the government to regulate and control related policy systems and help coal companies to break through the dilemma of overcapacity with the goal of low-carbon development
We can see that most of the literature focuses on the comparison of the policy effects of different types of environmental regulations, and this paper studies the impact of specific types of environmental regulations on the overcapacity of specific industries, which is mainly manifested through enterprise technological innovation
Summary
Environmental protection has always been the focus of all countries’ attention, and many countries are pursuing more stringent environmental regulations to achieve green and low-carbon development. e Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement signed by many countries aim to control greenhouse gas emissions; economic growth is inevitably accompanied by substantial increase in power generation [1]. The existing related researches, which mainly focus on the game between the central government, local governments, and coal enterprises [21,22,23], lack the investigation of external factors such as the market supply and demand environment [24] In this respect, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to contemplate the intensity of carbon emission reduction and coal market demand after technological upgrading in the coal and power industries, and studies the behavioral strategy relationship and dynamic evolution mechanism among the three-party game players of the local government, power industry, and coal enterprises under different constraint scenarios so as to provide a theoretical reference for the government to regulate and control related policy systems and help coal companies to break through the dilemma of overcapacity with the goal of low-carbon development.
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