Abstract
The rapid development of communication technology has greatly changed the way of information propagation. While making use of positive public opinion information in online social networks (OSN) to create value, it is necessary to manage and control the propagation of public opinion. Considering the existence of both positive and negative public opinion, we proposed a tripartite evolutionary game model through identifying the relevant stakeholders involved in the public opinion spreading process, discussed the equilibrium conditions of stakeholders’ behavior strategies emphatically and carried out simulation experiments. Then, based on the experimental results, the management strategy and the key intervention points of public opinion spreading were proposed. The result shows that the key to management and control public opinion is realizing the interest balance of all stakeholders. That is, the government should increase the benefits of netizens and media spreading (reporting) positive public opinion, and at the same time strengthen the punishment of them spreading (reporting) negative public opinion. This paper further expands the research of public opinion propagation in OSN, and provides theoretical support and decision-making basis for the management and control of public opinion.
Highlights
According to the 45th China Statistical Report on Internet Development published by China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), China had 904 millon netizens, of which 897 millon are mobile phone netizens, accounting for 99.3%, by March 28, 2020 [1]
The information propagation in Online Social Networks (OSN) enables netizens to break through the limitation of time and space in obtaining information, and they can participate in social interaction with various mobile terminals
Considering the existence of both positive and negative public opinion, we mainly analyzed the strategy selection of netizens, media and the government during the propagation process of public opinion, and a tripartite evolutionary game model was proposed based on evolutionary game theory
Summary
According to the 45th China Statistical Report on Internet Development published by China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), China had 904 millon netizens, of which 897 millon are mobile phone netizens, accounting for 99.3%, by March 28, 2020 [1]. Considering the existence and propagation of positive and negative public opinion, we proposed a tripartite evolutionary game model including netizens, media and the government, analyzed the possible equilibrium strategies and its’ stability conditions. C. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS EQUATION IN TRIPARTITE GAME MODEL On the basis of the above payoff function and Malthusian equation [23], we can get the replicator dynamics equation of netizens choosing to propagate positive and negative public opinion strategy, which as be expressed as follows:.
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