Evolutionary game model of government regulation of electric bus promotion behavior

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study aimed to improve the efficiency of government regulations and promote the market applications of electric buses. Based on evolutionary game theory, with electric bus manufacturers, passenger transport enterprises, and the government as the evolutionary game subjects, a tripartite evolutionary game model of production-use management is established. An equilibrium stabilization strategy was derived through game equilibrium and evolutionary stability analysis, and the influence of changes in key variables on the choice of promotion behavior of decision subjects was quantitatively analyzed. The results of the empirical analysis showed that when the government adjusts the policy subsidy between 6–10, the changes in the sensitivity of manufacturers and passenger transport enterprises are relatively high, and the decisions of both sides tend to be 1; if the government penalty is adjusted to 4.8–6.8, the government strictly regulates the promotion of electric bus policy, and the manufacturers and passenger transport enterprises choose to actively participate in the promotion strategy, effectively constraining the decision-making behavior of all parties, which verifies the validity and consistency of the model analysis conclusions. The conclusions will provide theoretical reference for the formulation of government regulatory policies and the development of low-carbon transportation.