Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Financial Risk Decision-Making in Global Supply Chain

Abstract

This paper focuses on the game evolution process and its influencing factors of financial risk cooperation behavior between suppliers and manufacturers in global supply chain system. Using two-population evolutionary game theory, the performance of supply chain members under financial risk environment is modeled. Further, the proposed financial risk game model is applied to simulation cases of global supply chain. Based on the theory analysis and simulation results, it is shown that the cooperation strategy is the optimal evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for all supply chain members, when facing the high financial risk. The financial risk-sharing coefficient can be regarded as an adjuster that affects risk ESS of both suppliers and manufacturers under the low financial risk setting. By reducing the financial risk-sharing ratio of one supply chain player, his intention of adopting cooperation strategy would be enhanced. Finally, it is observed that financial risk sharing approach may lead to the alignment among supply chain members. Therefore, setting up an effective financial risk-sharing mechanism is beneficial to realize sustainable development of global supply chain.