Evolutionary game and system dynamics for analysis on stakeholder strategies of regional high-speed rail project in investment decision stage

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic choices under the conflict among stakeholders of regional high-speed rail project at the investment decision stage in the context of the ‘high-speed rail controversy’. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model among the central government, the local government and China Railway, analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy, discusses the influence of multiple factors on the choice of tripartite strategy, and further calculates and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite evolutionary game system. Then the dynamic change trend of strategy choice brought by the change of each factor is investigated through system dynamics simulation. The results show that the lower the intervention cost and reward to the other two parties, and the increase of the opportunity cost of non-intervention and punishment to the other two parties, the faster the convergence of the central government's choice of intervention strategy. The increase of the rewards and punishments, and the increase of negotiation profits, non-negotiation costs, and loss of reputation for non-negotiation, and the decrease in the negotiation costs and non-negotiation profits all contribute to the shortening of the convergence time of the local government's choice of negotiation strategy. The increase of the rewards and punishments, the increase of support profits, the loss of reputation for non-support, and the decrease of the profits for non-support and the extra cost for support will promote the convergence of China Railway's choice of the support strategy. Finally, the simulation results are discussed so as to target feasible coordination strategies, which provides a theory basis for the practice of conflict coordination among stakeholders of regional high-speed rail project at the investment decision stage.