Evolutionary game and simulation of management strategies of fallow cultivated land: A case study in Hunan province, China

Abstract

To achieve sustainable use of cultivated land in China, it is important to consolidate the achievements of the large-scale program to leave cultivated land fallow. However, conflicts of interest among the participants make it difficult to achieve the expected goal. In this study, we first analyze the differences in the interests of the three main participants in the process of protecting cultivated land, that is, the central government, local government, and peasants. Then, we construct two evolutionary game models to examine the dynamic changes of their strategies and we compare the impacts of external factors on their strategies under different conditions using simulation analysis. The results show that, to stimulate peasants to protect cultivated land, the government should apply a relatively advanced dynamic subsidy strategy, which is able to make peasants more enthusiastic about protecting cultivated land using less time and money. The central government should provide better promotion opportunities for well-behaved local government officials, and appropriately punish uncooperative peasants and officials.