Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation With Multi-Agent Participation

Xu-Mei Yuan,Cui-Cui Zheng

doi:10.1109/access.2022.3143869

Xu-Mei Yuan, Cui-Cui Zheng

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3143869

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Abstract

Low-carbon technology innovation (LCTI) is an effective way to solve the problem of global climate change and reduce carbon emissions. Therefore, using evolutionary game theory, this research constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of LCTI involving the government, enterprises, and consumers. Moreover, this research investigates the strategic choices of the three parties in the process of LCTI, discusses the stability of the equilibrium point. In particular, it analyzes the influence of different factors on the strategic choices of the three parties through numerical simulation. The results indicate that, 1) the government, enterprises, and consumers are affected to different degrees by each other’s initial willingness; 2) the intensity of government regulation, innovation subsidies, and carbon tax rates have different effects on enterprises and consumers; 3) consumers are more sensitive to innovation subsidies. These results could provide references for enterprises to promote the development of LCTI.

Highlights

Climate change caused by excessive greenhouse gas emissions has attracted significant attention all over the world
To facilitate the analysis of the symbols of eigenvalues corresponding to different equilibrium points and have generality, the stability strategy of the evolutionary game is discussed in two cases: Case 1: when −R11+R12+αC2+βC3−R1+R2+θ C1 < 0, C2 − αC2 − γ T − R21 < 0, and C3 − βC3 − R31 < 0, that is, the benefits of the government selecting to regulate is greater than that of selecting not to regulate, the income of enterprises carrying out low-carbon technology innovation (LCTI) is greater than that of not carrying out LCTI, and the income of consumers purchasing non-LCTI products is less than that of purchasing LCTI products
The results show that increasing the purchase subsidy coefficient can mobilize consumers’ initiatives to purchase LCTI products, and promote enterprises to carry out LCTI from the demand side

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Climate change caused by excessive greenhouse gas emissions has attracted significant attention all over the world. Cao et al [45] constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises, and public consumers They analyzed the role of public consumers in promoting the diffusion of green technology innovation. Wang’s research team [47,48,49] analyzed the strategic choices of the government, enterprises, and consumers by using the evolutionary game and system dynamics methods They found that consumers’ demand for green products and green consumption consciousness have an essential effect on promoting enterprise green technology innovation. (6) α represents the cost subsidy coefficient of enterprise low-carbon technology innovation; β represents the subsidy coefficient for consumers to purchase LCTI products; γ represents the carbon tax rate; θ represents the government regulation intensity coefficient.

MODEL CONSTRUCTION

ANALYSIS OF CONSUMERS’ STRATEGY STABILITY

STABILITY ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM POINTS

A31 A32 A33 where

NUMERICAL SIMULATION

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS