Abstract

The effective implementation of cultivated land protection policies (CLPP) has important practical significance for improving China’s food security and ecological security. The central government, local governments, and farmers have mutually restricted and influencing interest relations. At the same time, the codes of behavior of multistakeholders also affect the implementation of CLPP in the social system. Therefore, this article discusses the behavioral tendencies and game relationships of relevant stakeholders in the implementation of CLPP from the perspective of evolutionary games and portrays a cognitive decision-making process closer to reality. Finally, numerical simulation reveals the key variables that affect the stability strategy. Results show the following: (1) As the main body of system supply, the central government should reconstruct the political achievement evaluation system and improve the status of the effective implementation of cultivated protection policies in the political achievement evaluation of local governments. (2) The central government should increase incentives for local governments to implement CLPP and increase penalties for violations to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation. (3) To optimize the actual implementation of CLPP, increasing awareness of farmers’ rights protection, reducing rights protection costs of farmers, and increasing the constraints on the flexible implementation of CLPP are necessary.

Highlights

  • Food is a special commodity and an important strategic reserve resource related to global human livelihoods

  • Us, to examine the deficiencies and problems in the implementation of cultivated land protection policies (CLPP), this study introduces evolutionary game theory method to construct an evolutionary game model for the implementation of CLPP. rough numerical simulation, an in-depth study is conducted on how various factors affect the dynamic strategy selection and control strategy of various stakeholders about policy implementation in different situations to provide theoretical support to realize the ideal situation of cultivated land protection

  • When analyzing the matrix eigenvalues, symbols, determinant, and trace of the above five possible equilibrium points in Table 3, this study finds that the strategic stability of the central government and local governments are affected by specific parameters

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Summary

Introduction

Food is a special commodity and an important strategic reserve resource related to global human livelihoods. Land use planning system refers to the spatial and temporal strategic layout and overall planning of residential land use layout, land use zoning, basic farmland protection zone delineation, and cultivated land internal planning and design according to national socioeconomic development requirements and local natural, economic, and social conditions in a certain period and certain area On this basis, the government conducts comprehensive land use balance accounting and planning implementation forecasts and proposes measures to ensure the implementation of the plan. Erefore, the implementation of CLPP takes place on a complex network of relationships Whether it can achieve the optimal allocation of cultivated land resources while balancing the relationship between various stakeholders to ensure the interests of farmers, social interests, and national interests is an important basis for improving the effectiveness of cultivated land protection. Us, to examine the deficiencies and problems in the implementation of CLPP, this study introduces evolutionary game theory method to construct an evolutionary game model for the implementation of CLPP. rough numerical simulation, an in-depth study is conducted on how various factors affect the dynamic strategy selection and control strategy of various stakeholders about policy implementation in different situations to provide theoretical support to realize the ideal situation of cultivated land protection

Evolutionary Game Model of the Implementation of CLPP
Model Construction
Numerical Simulation
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Full Text
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