Evolutionary Game Analysis on Sharing Bicycles and Metro Strategies: Impact of Phasing out Subsidies for Bicycle–Metro Integration Model

Abstract

The rapid development of sharing bicycles has facilitated the last mile of travel and provided new opportunities for the sustainable development of metro transportation. However, there is still insufficient literature on how to promote the bicycle–metro integration mode. This paper designs a bicycle–metro integrated model based on evolutionary game theory and explores the evolutionary mechanism of the sharing of bicycles connection system and metro system under the subsidy phasing out. The conditions for achieving different equilibrium states were discussed based on the replication dynamics equation. In order to prove the evolutionary game analysis, the system dynamics simulation model was used to reveal the effects of the cost factor, subsidy factor, reward, and penalty factors on the equilibrium of the integrated model. Moreover, the values of the influence factors that make the system reach the optimal equilibrium were obtained through sensitivity analysis. The results show that by reasonably adjusting the values of the parameters, sharing bicycles connection systems, metro systems and connection travelers can reach an equilibrium state where they are willing to cooperate. Subsidy phasing-out policies for travelers were key to promoting the equilibrium of the model. The unit price of shared bicycles has a greater impact on users, and the irregular parking ratio changes have a greater impact on the benefits of travelers compared to the benefits of the metro system. In order to promote bicycle–metro integration and enhance the attractiveness of metro transportation, policies designed for participants should be integrated with dynamic evolution.