Abstract
By introducing the theory of social co-governance into the field of e-commerce intellectual property protection, this paper builds an evolutionary game model among the government, e-commerce platforms, and rights holders, and studies the conditions under the stakeholders form a stable equilibrium state under different constraints. Combined with numerical simulation, the influence of individual factors and factor combinations on the system stability is analyzed. Results shows that: Strictly controlling the action costs and response costs of all parties can enhance their willingness to actively deal with infringement issues; reasonable adjustment of the reward and punishment measures of government supervisory agencies can produce sufficient reverse shock and positive guidance to platform and operators; penalties should be imposed on government supervisory agencies that are not sufficiently supervised; strengthen the construction of the social environment for intellectual property protection, improve the social benefits of actively responding to infringement issues, and increase the sense of acquisition by the government, platforms and rights holders. And it provides certain positive references and suggestions for the government to formulate relevant policies.
Highlights
In China, where the economy and social system are constantly evolving and changing, the internet economy, especially e-commerce business activities, has ushered in a new era of development (Kwak et al, 2019)
According to the model description and the specific requirements of intellectual property protection, we propose the following hypotheses: (1) We assume that the strategies of the government are, that is, the degree of looseness and strictness of the supervision and punishment mechanism
When the government imposes a high penalty on the platform under strict supervision, it can increase the government’s willingness to choose a strict supervision strategy; imposing a fine on the infringement of platform operators can allow the government to obtain certain benefits and ensure that it adopts strict supervision measures; and excessive amounts of rewards for e-commerce platforms will limit the probability of strict government supervision
Summary
In China, where the economy and social system are constantly evolving and changing, the internet economy, especially e-commerce business activities, has ushered in a new era of development (Kwak et al, 2019). According to the China E-Commerce Report 2020 issued by the Department of E-commerce and Information Technology of the Ministry of Commerce of China, China’s national e-commerce transaction volume in 2020 reached 37.21 trillion yuan, of which the national online retail sales reached 11.76 trillion yuan, ranking first in the world for eight consecutive years This reflects the extremely high commercial value and huge social influence of e-commerce and confirms that e-commerce has ushered in a new era in China (Huang and Li, 2019). The main purpose of this paper is to build a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, e-commerce platforms, and rights holders, analyze the relationship between them, reveal the strategy of the evolution mechanism, explore the construction methods of e-commerce intellectual property protection systems, and provide suggestions for the construction of China’s e-commerce intellectual property social co-governance system and strengthen China’s e-commerce intellectual property protection. Xu and Qi (2017) pointed out that e-commerce transactions have a certain degree of dependence on internet resources, while the development of the internet in China is not balanced, and the digital divide is obvious, which leads to the inevitable infringement of e-commerce intellectual property rights
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