Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Behavior Strategies of Participants in the Supply Chain Financial Credit Market under Government Subsidies

Abstract

On the basis of clarifying the participants in the supply chain financial credit market and their credit behaviors, we use the evolutionary game theory to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), core enterprises and financial institutions in the government subsidy environment, and analyze the equilibrium point. We also use numerical simulation to analyze the influence of changes in government subsidies and other factors and different initial conditions on the evolutionary results. The results show that: 1) The initial proportion of the active credit strategy selected by the game player has a significant impact on the evolution of the system; 2) Government subsidies have a great positive effect on the convergence of the credit system to the best stable state, but the function itself is not universal. Therefore, the government needs to rationally coordinate the subsidy quotas of participating entities in accordance with the actual situation, and provide targeted support and subsidies; 3) The higher the independent repayment rate of SMEs, the more the credit market converges to the best stable state.