Abstract

In China, the number of public–private partnership (PPP) projects in the museum field is relatively small, and the success rate is quite low, which highlights the drawback of an insufficient depth of overall promotion. To break through this dilemma, this paper objectively analyzes the interest demands and behavior-oriented conflicts between two stakeholders and constructs a game model based on limited rationality for the evolution of participation behaviors in museum PPP projects. In addition, different levels of government incentives are introduced along with the modeling and simulation of system dynamics (SD) to further clarify the dynamic evolution process of participants’ behavioral strategies. There are multiple complex scenarios associated with the system evolution according to the study. In a museum PPP project, the strategic choices of social forces and museums may have a mutual effect under different scenarios. Under the premise of guaranteeing the benefits of both sides of the game, there are two evolutionary stability strategies. Incentives from the government have a significant impact on the evolution of the game system at different stages of implementation. This paper hopes to provide reference and guidance to facilitate the formation of an appropriate action mechanism for participants and then ensure the sustainable promotion and development of the projects.

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