Evolutionary game analysis of multi-stakeholders in the WEEE recycling industry under propaganda subsidies and environmental damage taxes

Abstract

With an increase in the amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), the waste of resources and environmental hazards caused by WEEE cannot be ignored. Meanwhile, the lack of environmental awareness among consumers and the existence of informal recyclers pose a great challenge to the government in governing the WEEE recycling industry. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of the government and formal and informal recyclers. Then, the payoff matrix, replicator dynamic equations and all the equilibrium points are obtained, and a stability analysis of the equilibrium points is performed to derive the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) and their formation conditions. Finally, the influence of important parameters on the WEEE recycling industry is examined through numerical analysis. The results suggest that the government cannot ignore the existence of informal recyclers but should take governance measures to intervene in informal recycling and guide such recyclers to upgrade their processing technology. Moreover, the willingness of informal recyclers to invest in processing technology increases with the increase in environmental damage taxes. Second, the government should provide formal recyclers with appropriate promotional subsidies. Third, the government should control its own cost of governance and reduce its financial burden. Fourth, with government subsidies, formal recyclers should decide whether to make promotional investments based on the investment cost and the sum of the benefits from the investment and government subsidy. Finally, under government tax pressure and the influence of formal recyclers’ promotional investments, informal recyclers should actively invest in processing technology.