Evolutionary Game Analysis of Inter-provincial Diversified Ecological Compensation Collaborative Governance

Abstract

The inter-provincial watershed diversified ecological compensation (DEC) collaborative governance mechanism is an important initiative to achieve long-term ecological compensation. However, it is difficult to effectively coordinate the promotion of environmental protection and livelihood improvement due to the different interests of local governments. Based on the interest demands among local governments, this study analyzes the operation mode of DEC mechanism, constructs an evolutionary game model of DEC collaborative governance among local governments, and conducts dynamic simulation analysis with Shaanxi and Henan provinces as examples. The results show that the upstream government quickly chooses to actively participate when the downstream government's willingness to promote is more significant than 0.4. Fund allocation ratios of 0.7, 0.2, and 0.1 for government, market, and social compensation better promote collaborative governance strategies. The low-level cost can drive the upstream and downstream governments to construct a DEC mechanism. In addition, the reward and punishment mechanism is more effective for the downstream government, and the benefit allocation ratio significantly impacts the upstream government. The greater the absorption capacity of the upstream government, the more it can drive to realize social benefits and collaboration. To promote the DEC mechanism through collaborative governance and provide new ideas for ecological protection and development of the Yellow River basin (YRB).