Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Sharing in Fresh Product Supply Chain

Abstract

Fresh produce has increasingly become an important part of people’s diet. However, the loss of fresh produce in the supply chain has existed for a long time and is difficult to overcome. Some companies use their own information management systems or use information systems built by other companies to release and manage fresh agricultural product information in a timely manner, thereby reducing product loss caused by the “bullwhip effect.” However, this will also bring pressure on construction costs and the risk of information leakage. Based on the evolutionary game model, this paper conducts process modeling and analysis on the behavior of enterprise groups participating in information sharing. It is concluded that the greater the difference between the income obtained through information sharing and the cost of building information system, the higher the likelihood of enterprises participating in information sharing. In addition, the greater the profit from the construction of information platform, the smaller the profit of “free rider,” and the smaller the risk of information leakage, the greater the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in information sharing. Finally, some suggestions are proposed from the perspective of maximizing supply chain benefits.