Evolutionary game analysis of green production transformation of small farmers led by cooperatives based on prospect theory

Abstract

For countries with small farmers as the main body of agricultural production, green production transformation of small farmers is crucial to achieve green agricultural development. Based on the prospect theory, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of cooperative leading the green production transformation of small farmers, systematically deduces the possible combination of different strategies of both sides, and puts forward targeted countermeasures for improvement. Finally, the simulation is verified, and the influence of relevant parameters on the decision-making of both sides is analyzed. In the initial stage of green production transformation, the local government’s support to the cooperative supervision and incentive strategy is the key to the successful transformation. Cooperatives can effectively promote small farmers’ transition to green production by reducing green production costs and increasing their perceived ecological benefits, moral benefits and brand benefits, but the effect of simply increasing the proportion of dividends is not obvious. Under the supervision and incentive strategy of cooperatives, there is an interval in which small farmers adopt cooperation strategy but fail to realize income increase, so cooperatives should increase the benefit distribution of small farmers. The research results provide reference for the green production transformation of small farmers, and also have strong enlightenment for the cooperative hitchhiking governance.