Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emergency Management of the Middle Route of South-to-North Water Diversion Project

Abstract

In order to improve the efficiency of emergency management of the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP), and to guarantee the water supply function of the project, the intergovernmental cooperation system of emergency management for emergent events in the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project was established. The cooperation models of emergent events were built using Evolutionary Game Theory. The evolutionary influence of system parameters on respective governmental behaviour was analysed. The payment functions of the emergency agents involved were constructed, the corresponding replicator dynamic equations were established and evolutionary stable strategies were discussed. Theoretical and numerical analysis results show that: In order to let local government show strong willingness to implement emergency policies, the profit caused by local government i increases its implement policy willingness to more than the increased cost. Only MWR increases the penalty on local government when it shows weak willingness and let the penalty be more than the cost increased by weak willingness, can avoid all local government select weak cooperative willingness.