Evolutionary game analysis of construction waste recycling management in China

Abstract

With China's rapid industrialization and urbanization, building industry generates a large amount of construction waste, which is becoming a burgeoning problem for the local governments to ensure a sustainable and effective management of construction waste. There is a general agreement among researchers that construction waste recycling is an important means for curbing the deterioration of the environment in China. Previous studies have focused on the methods of waste treatment and the recycling behaviour of a single stakeholder, as well as lack of consideration of cooperation among different stakeholders. This study develops a dynamic evolutionary game model on construction waste recycling to analyse the symbiotic evolution between the behaviour of construction enterprises and recycling enterprises, in situations with or without government incentives. This research also investigates how government incentive policy affects the dynamic evolution process of the construction waste recycling. The results from this study show that subsidy to construction enterprises is essential to promote the construction waste recycling in China, but compensating recycling enterprises is not always necessary, because in certain cases as long as the construction enterprises recycle the waste, the recycling enterprises will participate in recycling spontaneously without subsidy. Finally, some suggestions and countermeasures are proposed to help achieving an efficient waste recycling management in China.