Abstract
Resource integration of coal enterprises is conducive to reducing pollution and carbon emissions, thus alleviating environmental problems such as global warming. Government regulation has a great influence on enterprise behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the strategies of government and coal enterprises in resource integration. Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. In addition, this paper further analyzes the impact of different government policies on coal enterprises' green innovation strategies. Results demonstrate that (1) when the power gap between enterprises is large, the probability of dominant enterprises choosing resource integration converges to 1, while the probability of inferior enterprises converges to 0. Therefore, government regulations are invalid for inferior enterprises; (2) the combination of government regulations can help improve the efficiency of coal enterprises' strategic choices. With the increase in the intensity of government rewards and punishments, the probability of enterprise resource integration evolves from 0 to 1; (3) excessive government regulations make the choice between the government and coal companies tend to swing, because the probability of the two is between 0 and 1. Therefore, excessive government regulations cannot effectively achieve resource integration and government regulation. (4) The government subsidy strategy is less effective than the government's pollution penalty strategy in promoting the green innovation of enterprises. Our research shows that the government should choose different policy combinations and intensities to regulate resource integration according to the market power of coal enterprises, which provides theoretical reference and practical guidance for the government to regulate corporate resource integration behavior.
Highlights
Recent years, human beings have been unscrupulously consuming the earth's resources of order to adapt to the rapid economic development, causing the increasingly prominent, climate issues, which draw global attention to the environmental issues (Nakajima et al, 2020)
(3) Case 3: the evolutionary game system converges to point D (1,1), indicating that when the maximum cost of government supervision is less than the minimum benefit to the government brought by the enterprise’s resource integration, at the same time, when the difference between the profits of the coal enterprise without resource integration and resource integration is less than the total amount of tax incentives and pollution penalties, the government tends to choose regulatory strategies, while enterprises tend to choose resource integration strategies under the constraints and guidance of government regulations
Different from previous studies, the differences in this paper are as follows: (1) Based on the bounded rationality, this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of participants in coal enterprise resource integration under government regulation, and uses a method, which is combination of empirical research and mathematical deduction; (2) When studying government regulations, this paper considers both incentive and punishment, and gives them specific policy implications;(3) In the context of simulation, this paper looks for the boundary of coal enterprise resource integration and government supervision strategy selection
Summary
Human beings have been unscrupulously consuming the earth's resources of order to adapt to the rapid economic development, causing the increasingly prominent, climate issues, which draw global attention to the environmental issues (Nakajima et al, 2020). It is often impossible to achieve the maximum effect of resource integration by relying solely on market response mechanisms, and it is necessary to use the power of government regulation to macro-control the merger of coal enterprises. In terms of government regulation, industrial policy has become an important external driving force for resource integration of coal enterprises. It is necessary to use evolutionary game theory to study the strategic choices of government supervision and enterprise resource integration. From the perspective of government regulation, this paper empirically examines the impact of resource integration on coal enterprise innovation and pollution, and gives government regulations practical policy implications for coal enterprises. From the perspective of government regulation, how do enterprises choose resource integration strategies to divide the interests of the existing market?.
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