Abstract

Food safety accidents occur frequently, which has caused great harm to people’s health. With the consideration that food quality requires the joint efforts of all members of the food supply chain and that quality‐improving efforts for food have a positive external effect, we focus on the quality‐improving effort level, which is very important for food quality and safety. This paper builds an evolutionary game model and employs the replicated dynamic equation to study evolutionarily stable strategies of suppliers and producers. Furthermore, simulation experiments are conducted to verify the modeling analyses and demonstrate the influences of game parameters. The research results show that the behavioral strategies are closely related to the factors such as the ratios of the input to the output, the cost of quality‐improving efforts, the hitchhiking benefits, and the initial strategy. Only when the punishing dynamics of the government exceeds a certain value, both participants can choose the quality‐improving effort strategy. Based on the results, this paper has provided some inspiration for policy‐making of government institutions.

Highlights

  • In recent years, because of the frequent occurrence of food safety accidents, great damage has occurred to the health of the people, causing widespread concern in the society. e No 1 document of China’s central government in 2019 once again stressed the importance of improving the food quality, improving the standard system of food quality, and e ectively ensuring the quality of food. e food supply chain usually involves the source’s supply of raw materials, production and processing, retail, and so on

  • Some scholars have studied the necessity of government regulation, and the results show that food safety is the basic responsibility of the government [21,22,23]

  • This paper analyzes the behavior strategy of suppliers and producers considering the quality-improving effort in the food supply chain. e research results show that the behavioral strategies are closely related to the factors such as the ratios of the input to the output, the cost of quality-improving effort, the hitchhiking benefits, and the initial strategy

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Summary

Introduction

Because of the frequent occurrence of food safety accidents, great damage has occurred to the health of the people, causing widespread concern in the society. e No 1 document of China’s central government in 2019 once again stressed the importance of improving the food quality, improving the standard system of food quality, and e ectively ensuring the quality of food. e food supply chain usually involves the source’s supply of raw materials, production and processing, retail, and so on. This paper studies the quality input behavior of food supply chain members from the perspective of quality effort. Some researchers have applied evolutionary game theory to study low-carbon scenarios [33, 34], pollution regulation [35, 36], enterprises’ cooperation and competition in the supply chain [37,38,39], and so on He et al [32] study an effective green incentive mechanism for the government to promote green tourism development by establishing a three-party dynamic evolutionary game model.

Research Assumptions
Game Model
Scenario I
Scenario II
Scenario III
Scenario IV
Scenario V
Analysis of Evolutionary Game under Punishment Mechanism
Numerical Simulation
Conclusions
Full Text
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