Abstract
Major infrastructure projects (MIPs) possess significant strategic positions in the national economy and social development. However, recently, the rent-seeking behavior between supervision units and project contractors has intensified in project construction. This paper aims to study the behavior decision-making of stakeholders in rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs. In the complex and uncertain environment of MIPs, game players have cognitive bias and value perception preference. Therefore, this study introduced prospect theory and constructed the perceived return matrix and evolutionary game model of MIP rent-seeking behavior supervision among project owners, supervision units, and project contractors. From the perspective of risk perception theory, the reasons for the behavioral tendencies of game participants and the conditions for the steady state of strategy selection were explored through system dynamics simulations. The results showed that the stable state of the optimal strategy in the rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs is related to the cognitive bias of the game players and is influenced by the level of regulation cost, the intensity of punishment and the size of accident losses. The contribution of this study lies in providing theoretical basis and decision support for constructing a long-term preventive mechanism for rent-seeking activities in MIPs.
Highlights
Major infrastructure projects (MIPs) are large-scale engineering facilities that provide basic public services for social production and economic development and people’s lives (Liu et al, 2018; Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg & Turner, 2018)
For the lack of effective supervision of MIPs resulting in safety accidents, this paper comprehensively considered the psychological factors such as loss avoidance and cognitive bias of game players, and introduced the prospect theory to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model for the rent-seeking behavior supervision among the project owners, supervision units and project contractors
The results showed that the stable state of the optimal strategy in the rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs is related to the cognitive bias of the game players and is influenced by the level of regulation cost, the intensity of punishment and the size of accident losses
Summary
Major infrastructure projects (MIPs) are large-scale engineering facilities that provide basic public services for social production and economic development and people’s lives (Liu et al, 2018; Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg & Turner, 2018). The increasingly prominent quality issues and frequent accidents have gradually revealed the regulatory deficiencies of MIPs. The project owner, the supervision unit, and the project contractor are the most important stakeholders in the MIPs. The decision and interaction for transaction behavior of all parties will have a significant impact on the projects (AsilianMahabadi et al, 2018; Mei et al, 2017; Yuan, 2017; Li et al, 2013). Due to the information asymmetry among stakeholders, the project contractor usually masters more about the project environment and actual working conditions than the project owner. It is difficult for the project owner to observe the construction behavior of the project contractor directly. The supervision unit may reduce the quality of supervision work, or seek rent from the project contractor with its supervision and acceptance
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