Abstract

The increasingly prominent mobile application security problem has seriously damaged the vital interests of the public and hindered the healthy development of the mobile application industry. Based on the evolutionary game model, this paper has presented the interactive evolutionary game model between the public and the application platform under the bounded rationality. Using the Jacobian matrix solution and numerical simulation methods, this paper studies the evolutionary stability result under different key parameters in terms of the cost of public participation and penalty intensity. The results show that the system exhibits three kinds of evolutionary stability results with the change in key parameters, increases the probability of government supervision, and reduces the cost of public participation and the degree of information asymmetry. Meanwhile, the penalty for application platform violations is increased, helping the system evolve to an ideal state. The research conclusions provide the basis and reference for effectively governing the mobile application security.

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