Evolutionary Game Analysis and Simulation of Government Regulation and Enterprise Pollution Control Behavior

Abstract

In the game of environmental governance, the strategic choice of government and enterprises affects the effect of environmental governance. This paper constructs an asymmetric evolutionary game model between the two subjects of “government-enterprise,” analyzes the strategy evolution path of each game subject and the factors affecting its strategy evolution by using the stability theorem of the differential equation, and discusses the evolutionary stability strategy of the system through the Jacobian matrix. In the numerical simulation part, the paper analyzes the interactive evolution path of the government and polluting enterprises in environmental governance, and simulates the impact of government punishment, enterprise pollution control cost, government reward and enterprise pollution control income on the system evolution and stability strategy when the government punishment is greater than the regulation cost. The study shows that the improvement of government rewards, enterprise pollution control income and government punishment can promote enterprises to strive to control environmental pollution. Government rewards can replace the government's regulation efforts. The higher the pollution control cost, the greater the opportunistic tendency of enterprises.