Evolutionary Dynamics of Passive Housing Initiatives in New Rural Construction

Abstract

In the context of China’s ambitious dual carbon goals, this study introduces an innovative reward–penalty incentive mechanism, grounded in evolutionary game theory, to develop a tripartite evolutionary game model concerning the construction of passive rural housing. This research meticulously analyzes the equilibrium and stability strategies of all involved parties and employs data simulation to examine the influence of varying parameters on the game dynamics. Our findings reveal that the government’s cost–benefit calculations significantly influence its decisions regarding passive housing initiatives. The study identifies optimal cost and benefit strategies for various developmental phases. Furthermore, the level of governmental rewards and penalties plays a crucial role in determining whether enterprises and farmers opt for passive housing solutions. The study establishes the efficacy of different incentive schemes at various stages. Importantly, the economic interests of enterprises and farmers are pivotal in their decision-making process regarding passive housing. The study advocates for a comprehensive set of measures to safeguard these interests, with a special emphasis on protecting farmers. In conclusion, this research offers substantial guidance for policy decisions aimed at transforming existing rural housing into passive housing, thereby aligning with China’s environmental and sustainability objectives.