Evolutionary dynamics of N-player sender-receiver game in networks with community structure.

Abstract

Network typology largely affects the evolutionary dynamics of collective behaviors in many real-world complex systems. As a conventional transmission model, the sender-receiver game paves the way to explore the evolution of honest signals between senders and receivers. In practice, the utilities of an agent often depend not only on pairwise interactions, but also on the group influence of players around them, and thus there is an urgent need for deeper theoretical modeling and investigations on individuals' non-pairwise interactions. Considering the underlying evolutionary game dynamics and multiple community network structures, we explore the evolution of honest behaviors by extending the sender-receiver game to multiple communities. With the new dynamical model of the multi-community system, we perform a stability analysis of the system equilibrium state. Our results reveal the condition to promote the evolution of honest behaviors and provide an effective method for enhancing collaboration behaviors in distributed complex systems. Current results help us to deeply understand how collective decision-making behaviors evolve, influenced by the spread of true information and misinformation in large dynamic systems.