Evolutionary Dynamics of Mandatory Lane Changing for Bus Exiting

Ronghan Yao,Wenyan Qi,Li Sun,Xiaojing Du,Daxin Tian

doi:10.1155/2021/2958647

Ronghan Yao, Wenyan Qi + Show 3 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/2958647

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Abstract

With the development of the connected autonomous bus, the interactions between the bus and social vehicle during the mandatory lane changing for bus exiting become more diverse and complex. This research investigates the evolutionary dynamics of behavioral decision-making for the bus and social vehicle in different scenarios. The evolutionary game model for the connected autonomous bus and social vehicle is built, as do the human-driven bus and social vehicle, and the connected autonomous bus under different penetration rates and social vehicle. The results of numerical experiments reveal that the connected autonomous bus chooses to change lanes in most instances, and the strategies of the human-driven bus show conservative tendencies. Such tendencies are weakened when the connected autonomous bus and human-driven bus are mixed. As for the social vehicle in different scenarios, the strategies that balance overall traffic safety and efficiency are promoted. This research provides some references for intelligent decision-making of lane changing in urban public transportation.

Highlights

Mandatory lane changing for bus exiting is one essential part in the daily operations of the human-driven bus
The mandatory lane-changing issue for bus exiting is modeled by applying the evolutionary game theory
The evolutionary game models for CAB and HDS, HDB and HDS, and BPR and HDS are formulated, respectively, in order to analyze the evolutionary dynamics under different scenarios. e payoff matrices of the bus and social vehicle are constructed mainly from the perspectives of the safety benefit, safety loss, time benefit, and time loss

Summary

Introduction

Mandatory lane changing for bus exiting is one essential part in the daily operations of the human-driven bus In this lanechanging process, the bus driver must make reasonable behavioral decision-making to guarantee driving safety and efficiency [1, 2]. Lwamura and Tanimoto discussed the interactions between social vehicles on the highway by applying the evolutionary game theory, and the result implied that a social dilemma was hidden in the lane changing [29]. On this basis, Tanimoto et al analyzed the lane-changing behaviors of social vehicles in different scenarios, such as human-driven and autonomous driving environments [30].

Models

Stable-State Analysis

Numerical Experiments

Conclusions