Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on interdependent networks with the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game

Abstract

The world in which we are living is a huge network of networks and should be described by interdependent networks. The interdependence between networks significantly affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on them. Moreover, due to the diversity and complexity of social and biological systems, players on different networks may engage in different forms of interactions, which should be described by multiple game models in the evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game. We therefore study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on two interdependent networks playing different games, respectively. We show that, with the increment of network interdependence, the evolution of cooperation is dramatically promoted on the network playing Prisoner's Dilemma, and the cooperation level of the network playing Snowdrift Game reduces correspondingly. Remarkably, there exists an optimal intermediate region of network interdependence maximizing the growth rates of cooperation on the network playing Prisoner's Dilemma. Also on the network playing Prisoner's Dilemma, players contacting with the other network have an advantage in the evolution of cooperation over the other players on the same network, which is contrary to the network playing Snowdrift Game.