Abstract
Preventing global warming requires overall cooperation. Contributions will depend on the risk of future losses, which plays a key role in decision-making. Here, we discuss an evolutionary game theoretical model in which decisions within small groups under high risk and stringent requirements toward success significantly raise the chances of coordinating to save the planet's climate, thus escaping the tragedy of the commons. We discuss both deterministic dynamics in infinite populations, and stochastic dynamics in finite populations.
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