Evolutionary compromise game on assortative mixing networks

Abstract

Different from the cooperative game, in reality, heterogeneous individuals who choose to cooperate usually need to make a consistent strategic decision instead of directly entering the process of dividing payoffs. During the process of making consensus decisions, subjective psychology is a key factor affecting the final result, especially when individuals have similar abilities. Considering the subjective attitudes and objective abilities, this paper proposes a compromise game to model the dynamic change of subjective compromise value of individuals, which is a kind of psychological game. Here, the compromise value represented by parameter α is the strategy in game, which ranges from 0 to 1. And in terms of the continuous nature of compromise value α, we use particle swarm optimization to update strategies. Moreover, the subjective attitudes are profoundly affected by social surroundings, and thus we simulate this model on diverse assortative mixing networks by regulating the assortativity coefficient r. Simulations show that the compromise value of individuals gradually decreases as the assortativity of networks increases, and the compromise values of high-degree individuals are much higher than that of low-degree individuals in networks. Through the simulation results, we find that the subjective compromise of individual is greatly relevant with environment, which is important for the development of individuals. When meeting the individuals who have the similar ability, individuals from disassortative network tend to persist himself compared with individuals from assortative networks.